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Multi-Employer 
Bargaining-Ontario Trucking: 
A Case Study 
Graeme H. McKechnie 
In this case study of the Ontario trucking industry, 
the author considers the « for hire » section of the industry 
and, within this section, emphasizes gênerai freight trans-
port in order to illustrate the advantages and shortcomings 
of the multi-employer bargaining system. 
The Ontario trucking industry is a major segment of the trans-
portation industry in Canada. It provides within a single example a 
sophisticated model of multi-employer bargaining and, surprisingly, an 
enigma of turbulent labour relations highlighted by wildcat strikes. Tur-
bulence in Ontario trucking has been amply documented in newspaper 
headlines, in Royal Commission Submissions and in speeches of labour 
and management. In fact, gloomy prédictions about the state of labour 
relations in the industry are made based on its public image. The Teams-
ters hâve been accused by public, management and government sources 
alike of promoting violence, outright villainy and gênerai disruption of 
the industry.1 Management officiais hâve indicated that the industry has 
had trouble attracting high quality personnel because of the ugly labour 
relations the public has corne to 
take for granted. McKECHNIE, G. H., Associate Pro-
fessor, Department of Economies, 
York University. 
* The Author would like to thank his colleague, Professor J. T. Montague 
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
l See for example : Kitchener Waterloo Record, Feb. 11, 1966 ; The Telegram 
Feb. 11, 1966; Welland-Port Colborne Tribune, Feb. 22, 1966; The Telegram, Feb. 
23, 1966 ; Brantjord Expositer, March 23, 1966 and Ottawa Journal, March 23, 1966. 
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Yet, collective négociation in the industry as it has emerged is much 
more supportable than one would expect, for the public image does'not 
include a number of relevant and positive characteristics of the System. 
Negotiations hâve been marked by sophisticated and demonstrated overall 
cohésion. Union locals hâve bargained as a unit with an employer's asso-
ciation and hâve engaged in work stoppages as a unit. This cohésion has 
transcended, as will be discussed later, the chaotic internai politics of the 
Ontario Teeamsters. 
Further it is ail too easy to overlook the fact that « growing-pains » 
of the industry itself may be a root cause of troubled labour management 
confrontations. While providing one of the most critical transportation 
services in the economy, the trucking industry has grown to its existing 
proportions in the short space of the last quarter of a century. Only in 
the last décade, hâve the trucking services slowed to a rate of growth, 
which is still impressive, but more in keeping with other forms of trans-
port. In fact, the industry almost spurted to a front and centre position in 
the single décade of the forties ant did so arnid the throes of a tough 
compétitive struggle. The major surge of growth in trucking came about 
largely by attracting shippers of high value goods away from the railways. 
Continuing close compétition between truck and rail transport has been 
a factor in the similarities in labour relations policies in the two modes 
of transportation2. 
It is impossible to discuss ail sections of the trucking industry in this 
paper, even restricting the géographie area to Ontario. This paper, there-
fore, will consider the « for-hire » section of the industry and within this 
section emphasize gênerai freight transport. This excludes a number of 
areas, most notably private trucking, which is a large segment of the 
total industry, posing a real threat to the for-hire section. 
Industrial Relations in Ontario Trucking 
Collective bargaining in the Ontario for-hire trucking industry is 
carried out between the Motor Transport Industrial Relations Bureau and 
locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as represented by 
their Joint Council. 
2
 D. B. S. statistics indicate that net ton miles performed by the for-hire 
section of the industry in Ontario doubled between 1956-61. Across Canada, road 
transport accounted for 9% of total net ton miles performed in 1965 compared to 
rail- 42%, water - 2 7 % and pipeline - 22%. Comparative figures in 1950 were : 
road - 10%, rail - 47%, water - 26% and pipeline - 17%. Source : D. B. S. Daily 
Bulletin, June 28, 1965 and D. B. S. Catalogue 53-207. 
MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING - ONTARIO TRUCKING : A CASE STUDY 171 
The Bureau is an employers' organization in keeping with the terms 
of the Labour Relations Act of Ontario and the Industrial Relations and 
Disputes Investigation Act3 . It was formed in 1944 largely at the 
insistence of the Teamsters as they sought to find a clear expression of 
employer policies. Teamsters' organizing drives gained momentum in the 
United States during the forties and the union subsequently extended its 
influence to Canadian truck drivers. Demands for multi-employer collect-
ive bargaining were presented to Canadian employers as they had been 
in the U.S. This makes the organization somewhat unique in that it repre-
sents the resuit of the récognition by both labour and management that the 
industry had need for a single voice in negotiations. More often such a 
System is a défensive tactic of employers. 
The Bureau that arose represents 65 companies employing almost 
10,000 workers in Ontario and Québec. Approximately 25 companies 
are not members of the Bureau. Each member company is limited to one 
nomination for élection to the Bureau's eleven member Board of Directors. 
This policy was adopted to prevent domination of Bureau policies by 
large companies, a concern in the industry since there are only a few 
companies with 500 employées or more. The majority of firms employ 
less than 100 workers. 
Negotiations by the Bureau cover more than one type agreement on 
behalf of its members - including multi-employer and individual agree-
ments. Thèse agreements cover the company and ail its terminais. Com-
panies who are non-members bargain individually and usually follow the 
pattern established by the Bureau in the Master Agreement. 
The Bureau does a complète job as bargaining représentative. It 
represents member companies in negotiation, arbitration and conciliation 
proceedings. In addition it offers advice on personnel problems, présents 
the views of the industry in législative matters and appears at inquiries 
or Royal Commissions. 
The IBT has approximately 21,000 members across Ontario who 
make up the Ontario Joint Council which is a member of the Central 
States Conférence. Union membership is most prévalent in the larger 
companies. Workers in firms with their own trucking facilities are usually 
members of the Union certified for the company. 
The union structure is such that North-South relationships hâve 
remained strong. The Ontario Teamster locals are members of the Central 
3
 The Labour Relations Act, R. S. O. 1960, Chapter 202 as amended, Section 1 
(1) (f) and Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigations Act, R. S. O., 1952. 
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States Région of the IBT rather than part of any Canadian organization. 
In fact, few attempts hâve been made to strenghten East-West (Canadian) 
links in the trucking industry at least4. 
The Joint Council in Ontario is comprised of seven members from 
each of the eleven Teamster Locals in the Province who in turn elect a 
seven member executive. For bargaining purposes, three of the joint 
council members from each local that is party to the agreement comprise 
the bargaining team. 
Since there is centralization or organization of both employée and 
management, the style of collective bargaining in the trucking industry 
is one of centralization and concentration. It is consistent in ail respects 
with the meaning of multi-employer bargaining. In other words, bar-
gaining in trucking has gone a step further than is usual5. There is 
nothing in the Labour Relations Act regarding the certification of bar-
gaining units to correspond with that found in trucking - it is a voluntary 
move. Herman states that until 1950 the OLBR had discretionary autho-
rity to certify such units ; however, this was withdrawn after 1950 and 
not reinstated 6. The Task Force on Labour Relations recognizing actual 
practice recommended « that an accréditation System of an employer asso-
ciation along the Unes of existing union certification procédures, be made 
available on a trial basis in trucking, longshoring, and any other fédéral 
industry where the Canada Industrial Relations Board considers it appro-
priate7 ». Récent changes in Ontario law indicate that procédures for 
accréditation of employers' association are now available. 
Multi-employer Bargaining 
S. Eastman has defined multi-employer bargaining as follows : « AU 
Systems of bargaining in which représentatives of a number of separate 
firms act as a group in negotiating with représentatives of their workers 8 ». 
This définition allows the distinction to be made between varions styles 
of multi-employer bargaining. Negotiating may take place between em-
4
 Opinions taken from personal interviews. 
5 Commerce Clearing House, Canadian Labour Terms 1970, CCH Canadia» 
Ltd., Toronto, 1970, p. 50, defines multi-employer bargaining as : collective bar-
gaining between a union and a group or groups of employers. 
6
 HERMAN, E., Détermination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit, Canada 
Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1966, p. 130. 
7 Privy Council Office, Canadian Industrial Relations, Ottawa, 1969, p. 159. 
8 EASTMAN, S., « An Analysis of Multiple-Employer Collective Bargaining Based 
on Three Case Studies », Canadian Journal of Economie and Political Science, 
XVIII, November 1952, p. 464. 
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ployers' représentatives and représentatives of employées from the same 
local, or group of locals of one international union (e. g., the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). On the other hand, employers' repré-
sentatives could face employée représentatives of locals of many interna-
tional unions. The union side of the negotiations may take the form of 
(a) représentatives from each local or (b) an elected or selected team 
representing a joint union council. 
In the same manner, groups of employers may elect a bargaining 
team or they may sélect a neutral (a « non-employer ») to bargain on 
their behalf. In the latter case, the employers hâve usually forrned an 
association which may hâve a life of its own even after contract nego-
tiations are concluded, although this continuous activity is not a sine qua 
non. Ontario trucking fits the style of a continuing organization. 
J.T. Carpenter in his book Employers Associations and Collective 
Bargaining in New York City has distinguished three basic models or 
Systems, - the informai, closed and open patterns9. In the informai 
pattern, the employers' association is forrned before each contract nego-
tiating period begins and functions until the collective agreement has 
been signed. On this date, the association disappears. The composition 
of such a group can change each time negotiations take place. This is a 
minimum form of formai employers' organization for bargaining purposes. 
There are, of course, occasions where even more informai arrangements 
are made which do not bear directly on the bargaining process. For 
example, firms may simply exchange information concerning labour 
relations policy. Thèse firms may even go so far as to engage in « parallel 
bargaining10 » , in which management représentatives discuss collective 
bargaining goals and the limits of acceptance of union demands. In thèse 
cases, the employers do not face the union as a group but bargain indivi-
dually. Thèse employers are not engaged in multi-employer bargaining. 
Actually, they may be in différent industries and facing différent inter-
national unions. But the effect may be the same as multi-employer 
bargaining. An interesting related question, but outside the scope of this 
paper, is just how collective bargaining Systems are handled in conglo-
merate enterprises. 
9 CARPENTER, J.T., Employers? Associations and Collective Bargaining in New 
York City., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1950, pp. 105-157. 
10
 MCPHERSON, W. H., « Coopération Among Auto Managements in Collective 
Bargaining », Spring Proceedings, I. R. R. A., May 1960, Reprinted in Labour Law 
Journal, Chicago, July 1960, p. 607. 
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The second pattern Carpenter cites is that of a closed style negotia-
tion in which ail employers in an industry are members of the association 
that bargains with the union. This position would appear to represent a 
position of equity since ail workers and ail employers are « organized » 
to bargain jointly. 
The third pattern and the one which is characteristic of the situation 
in the Ontario trucking industry is what Carpenter calls an open negotia-
ting style. In this pattern the employers' organization is permanent and 
is likely to remain active in the periods between contract negotiations. The 
organization is comprised of a fairly constant group of employers. In 
addition there are a number of « independent » employers in the industry 
who negotiate and sign individual contracts with the union. Thèse inde-
pendents may follow the pattern of the employers' association. 
Readily obtainable figures on the incidence of multi-employer bar-
gaining do not exist in Canada. S. Eastman indicates that in 1946, « 26% 
of ail workers under collective agreements were covered by agreements 
negotiated by associations or groups of employers n » . Herman, in 1966, 
states that in Ontario, 56,629 employées in bargaining units of 500 or 
more workers were covered by agreements negotiated on a multi-employer 
or association basis12. Unfortunately, such analysts hâve been more 
impressed with the number of agreements that are signed as multi-employer 
or multi-plant contracts as opposed to the implicit broadening of bargain-
ing relationships. As a resuit it is difficult to be accurate with respect to 
the numbers of workers covered by multi-employer bargaining. 
Employer représentatives in the Trucking industry felt that the 
incidence of negotiation on this basis is on the increase. The Task Force 
on Labour Relations reported that in 1965, in Canada, approximately 
12% of agreements covering 500 or more employées were bargaining 
on an employer association basis 13. 
Variables Leading to the Création of 
an Employers Association 
Industrial conditions can be cited that would seem to encourage the 
création of some form of employers' association for labour relations 
purposes. On a simple power analysis one might expect employers to ban 
il EASTMAN, E., op. cit., p. 464. 
12 HERMAN, S., op. cit., p. 189. 
13 Privy Council Office, op. cit., p. 61. 
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together in industries in which labour-management confrontations are 
fréquent and hostile — i.e., employers would organize to combat over-
whelming union power. Although there are instances of hostility and work 
stoppages in industries which hâve given rise to multi-employer action, 
centralizing pattern in the relationship would likely be présent even without 
this bargaining expérience. The more important impetus to bargaining in 
groups cornes from the product and labour markets. Even though the 
Ontario Labour Relations Board certifies bargaining units on a terminal 
by terminal basis, in the trucking industry, there is strong market motiva-
tion for employers to bargain as a group. A number of market variables 
corne into play. 
a) With respect to wages, S. Eastman showed that even before a 
multi-employer association was formed in the trucking industry in Ontario, 
significant similarities of wages existed among firms in the industry14. 
This interdependence arises from the nature of the compétition in the 
product market as well as the labour market. Labour costs make up a 
large proportion of total costs - approximately 20%, thus the désire to 
take wages out of compétition existed. 
b) The number and size of firms in the industry also had an impact 
on the growth of an employées association for bargaining purposes. The 
industry in Ontario taken as a whole, is made up of a very large number 
of small trucking companies - the majority with less than 50-100 workers. 
Some sections of the industry are more likely to show this pattern than 
others - for example, a majority of the holders of Class F licenses are 
dump truck operators. In this section, the standard operating unit is 
comprised of only two or three trucks. There is virtually free entry to 
this section of the industry, i.e., little législation and limited cost of 
equipment. In the General Freight section of the industry, Class A, B, C 
licenses, entry is limited by législation and cost of equipment. The Ontario 
Highway Transport Board is charged with the responsibility of receiving 
applications for entry into this section, advertising them and holding 
hearings, if opposition to the application is made. The hearing will 
détermine whether the applicant can demonstrate that his entry is required 
by « public necessity and convenience ». Even with thèse limits, the prac-
ticality of using simple technology and of ignoring possible économies of 
scale allows a number of small trucking companies to remain in this 
section of the industry. Nevertheless, the number of firms is decreasing 
and the average size of firm is increasing. 
14 EASTMAN, S., op. cit., p. 465. 
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Thus the trucking industry offers ail the classic characteristics of 
an industry in which management meets market forces which encourage 
wage uniformity and collective action. A rising oligopoly with little 
product differentiation or variation in labour requirements make wage 
uniformity almost mandatory. And for the small firms the price leader-
ship of the oligopoly provides a compelling limit on their décision making. 
c) The composition of the labour force within the industry also 
provides encouragement for employer organization. Technology in the 
industry is relatively simple and few classifications of employées exist. 
If white collar employées are excluded, four classifications remain - high-
way drivers, pickup and delivery drivers, mechanics and maintenance, 
and dockworkers and checkers. The lower the number of the classific-
ations the easier it becomes to provide for uniformity throughout the 
industry and the greater the threat of employée mobility. 
d) Two centralizing factors dominate the product market. First 
the government licensing system has made for overall oligopolistic or-
ganization of the industry. Second the truckers hâve themselves intro-
duced the stabilizing influence of a rate filing system. 
In the past, the Canadian Transport Tariff Bureau Association 
members hâve met frequently to discuss rates and arrived at a concensus 
that ail carriers, particularly large firms, could follow. But in 1963, a 
rate filing system was established. Under this scheme, rates charged by 
trucking companies are published and, once in effect, rates other than 
those filed are prohibited until proposed changes are filed with the 
association for 30 days. 
It is clear that the industry has sought stability in the product market 
that was bound to be reflected in industrial relations. But it is also very 
clear that the system is very much on trial in the market conditions of 
the présent time. Recentiy, the industry has been involved in what has 
been described as a « rate war ». While the rate filing system is still being 
followed, changes in rates are being filed almost daily. The industry has 
suffered employment cutbacks as part of gênerai slowdown of the econ-
omy which in turn has provided the impetus for rate cutting. 
e) The lack of a fixed workplace and the resulting sociological 
characteristics of the work force provide further encouragement to comb-
ined employer action. Employées for most of their working time are not 
under strict supervision. In fact, in the case of longhaul over-the-load 
freight, the driver may be away from his home terminal a large? portion 
of the time. Since ail firms are in similar positions, it would seem logical 
that uniform standards would be désirable. Truckers are in constant con-
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tact with one another on the road. The vision of the « truck stop > is 
clear in everyone's mind. The ease of communication in this industry 
is such that interdependence and resulting attempts at uniformity are 
inévitable. 
Advantages to Organîzation in Trucking 
One gênerai comment is in order. The employers are far from 
sheltered from compétition, both from within the industry and from 
alternative means of transport. Multi-employer bargaining as such may 
find support in the nature of the product market but the thrust of the 
exercise is in the direction of good industrial relations in an effort to 
make life in the product market a little more manageable. A profitable 
existence dépends on a reasonable industrial relations system. In fact, 
the collective agreement states that the intent is to promote and improve 
both industrial relations efficiency and économie efficiency. 
There are spécifie advantages to centralized organization for both 
the employer and the union. Among the employers' advantages, three items 
appear most important : the maintenance of a united front ; self-policing 
and removal of wages from compétition. 
The employers' organization, if cohesive, can prevent successful 
« whip-sawing tactics » by the union. The union's ability to single out a 
small employer for a threatened or actual strike may be sufficient to con-
vince that employer to sign a pattern-setting agreement. If this employer 
is part of an association, and if ail members of the association take con-
certed action to support the smaller company, the union is presented 
with a différent situation. Employer cohésion may be a double edged 
sword since ail companies who are members of the organization may 
hâve to close their own doors. This can be serious if alternatives are 
available to consumers. In the « for-hire » trucking industry, two éléments 
of compétition are important — compétition from other modes of trans-
portation and fear of increases in private trucking15. 
Existence of an employers' association will aid in policing of the 
agreement, through common contract interprétation. This will add another 
élément of security for the individual trucking company. 
Multi-employer negotiations tend to remove the wage variable from 
compétition. The union was the major proponent of this uniformity when 
*5 with regard to rail — especially piggy back, the current contract allows 
this only if regular highway drivers are fully used or if loads can't be reduced to 
highway maxima. 
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it encouraged the formation of the employers' association as part of this 
goal. On the employer side, fears that removal of wage compétition would 
lead to the increase of price compétition based on non-wage costs hâve 
not materialized.16 While there has been less compétition in trucking 
rates in récent years than in the 1940's and earlier, wage uniformity, per-
haps a f actor in compétitive pricing, seems not to hâve been a prime cause. 
There are also advantages to the union arising from multi-employer 
bargaining — for example, ease of administration, uniformity and strike 
tactics. It is clear that a union leadership that negotiates and administers 
over 40 contracts, as would be required in the General Freight section of 
the industry, is operating most inefficiently. The combination of employers 
into one association signing one agreement is préférable. 
The union also benefits from uniform standards applied by each 
company to each employée. If in addition to the uniformity in the contract, 
common adjudication procédures are in effect and the union is able to 
conduct its affairs in an équitable way for each member. 
The organization may give the union some advantage in strike tactics. 
The impact of a strike may be much greater if the entire industry can be 
shut down, especially with the forais of compétition mentioned earlier — 
rail, private trucks, etc. This does hâve a reverse side, however, in that if 
the union is to shut down this industry, it, like the employer, must be 
prepared to face the effects of possible changes in the product market. 
Disadvantages to Organization 
The employers within an organization formed for bargaining pur-
poses may not reap only advantages. Even within an apparently strong 
organization, small companies, with relatively poor profit situations will 
exist. Such companies are, of course, apt to do one of two things. They 
may give in to union pressure with only token résistance just to make 
sure they remain operational. Or, at the other extrême, they may force 
unrealistic financial horizons on the employer group. Either way the asso-
ciation has an uneasy time. Smaller companies hâve in the past defected 
from organizations at critical times and signed an early agreement that 
plagues the larger group. The interests of the larger firms will of course 
be best served if smaller and less affluent firms who want to break away 
will wait and sign the negotiated contract after the pattern signed under 
the multi-employer bargaining. 
16 EASTMAN, S., op. cit., p. 470. 
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This problem of variations in the success of enterprises is very difficult 
to overcome in bargaining. Persuasion from other member companies 
may be sufficient to maintain a united front. However, other incentives 
such as strike insurance and cost sharing may become necessary. One 
solution suggested by the Task Force on Labour Relations is to certify 
employers' associations in the same way as union certification now occurs. 
Thus the association would become the exclusive bargaining agent for 
the employers. There are certainly historical biases against this existing 
in the credo of entrepreneurial freedom and untold administrative issues 
to be faced. 
The employers' association for bargaining can be seen as a growth 
from informai coopération to common collective bargaining goal setting, 
to pattern setting and finally to interdependence and multi-employer ne-
gotiations. Législative forcing of this progression could be unsound in 
both a practical and économie sensé. For example, a few large employers 
in an industry where numerous small companies exist may be put in so 
dominant a position that they can dictate a solution that drives smaller 
firms from the field. Or accréditation could enable the larger companies 
to use this domination to maintain monopoly profits through insisting on 
wages at levels of less profitable firms in the group. The resuit could be 
either induced improvements in efficiency by smaller firms to compete 
or increased financial returns to the larger firms and subséquent amal-
gamations. If smaller firms could not compete, a rate war might resuit 
and lack of cohésion appear. On the other hand, amalgamations could 
resuit in an even more cohesive organization since larger firms would 
begin to gain greater control in the industry. In Ontario the latter situation 
seems to be developing. 
Another disadvantage for the employer is the loss of bargaining at 
the plant level. Negotiating a master agreement, without supplemental 
company or terminal agreements, means that each firm must be willing and 
able to subscribe to standard practices. Master negotiations could in part 
overlook local terminal conditions. This does not appear to be a problem 
in that no supplemental agreements on substantive items are signed in 
Ontario. Again this reveals the strength of the social and économie charac-
teristics provided by the labour and product markets in the industry. 
Memoranda covering contract administration, however, are signed on a 
company or terminal basis. 
From the union side of the negotiating table, the existence of the 
association may présent a lockout threat whereas individual bargaining 
allows leverage. 
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In summary, multi-employer bargaining tends to lead to wage uni-
formity and may allow employers to project labour costs more accurately. 
Herman suggests that multi-employer négociations are more mature than 
single unit negotiations because of better information and more long run 
views of the parties.17 Uniformity does not necessarily lead to removal of 
wages as a compétitive factor in terms of unit costs as there is still plenty 
of room for variation in the productivity of labour. This is borne out by 
the récent expérience in Ontario when some industry officiais feel that 
the rate war being waged is the resuit of failure of employers to recognize 
fully their unit labour cost functions. 
The Ontario Expérience 
In Ontario as in other places, the économie organization of the truck-
ing industry favours multi-employer style of bargaining and its effective 
opération. The interesting feature in Ontario is the success of the Bureau. 
In fact, the remarkable achievement of trucking negotiations is the con-
tinuous opération of the Bureau and its strength during contract disputes. 
In contrast, associations in the United States are typically informai and 
active only during negotiations. They either disappear or lie dormant in 
periods between the contract talks. Few organizations hâve permanent 
staff members who will serve as a unifying force in the industry as the 
Bureau does in Ontario. There appear to be five spécial reasons for the 
Ontario Bureau's strength and cohésion. 
a) The continuing organizational structure of the Bureau. The Bureau 
has now become an incorporated body which lends more weight to its per-
manency. The secretary-manager is the only full time staff member and 
he is guided by the Board of Directors. 
b) The weakness of the Union in Ontario. This may be a major 
factor in employer solidarity because employers hâve needed broad insights 
on which to base their strategy. The Ontario locals, particularly the largest 
local, in Toronto, hâve undergone considérable internai dissention of an 
ideological nature. This has resulted in a lack of cohésion. This is in direct 
contrast to U.S. expérience where strong figures hâve been présent to 
control dissident factions within the Union. 
In Ontario, centralization within the union has not had the strength 
that has been identified with the U.S. parent union. This is also noticeable 
at the national level where until recently, no clear leader has even begun 
to émerge. While discussions do take place regarding national contracts, 
n HERMAN, E., op. cit., p. 119. 
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union officiais are ever mindful of internai local problems that must be 
solved before a national policy can be realized. 
The lack of centralization and its résultant tendency to local au-
tonomy has led to intra-union rivalry and subséquent confusion and frustra-
tion at the negotiating table. Division in the union ranks has led to local 
trusteeship by the IBT on a number of occasions. In addition, struggles 
for leadership on both ideological and gênerai rank and file problems 
hâve split union forces at times when cohésion was needed. For example, 
during the 1965 negotiations in which a long strike occurred, the Toronto 
local was undergoing severe leadership problems. This had a serious 
impact on bargaining as shifting membership allegiances caused uncertain-
ties for the bargaining committee. 
c) The Bureau and the Union hâve drawn up sophisticated techniques 
for contract administration. The method of contract interprétation and 
discussion of problems arising are handled in two ways. Grievances at 
the last step before outside arbitration are handled by the Joint Grievance 
Committee or « inside board » which is comprised of four members — 
two from each party. The parties appear to be satisfied with this method. 
Discussion with Union and Bureau représentatives indicate that 90% of 
the grievances are referred to this Board and 80% of thèse are settled 
by it. 
The other technique of contract administration developed by the 
parties, without référence to outside direction, is the monthly meeting 
of the Spécial Joint Committee. This Committee meets to clarify policy 
questions arising out of the interprétation of the agreement. Once décisions 
are made, thèse are binding. No change can, of course, take place in the 
terms of the agreement. Discussions with the parties revealed that during 
the first year of the agreement, thèse meetings were helpful. However, as 
negotiations approached, the meetings became « mini-bargaining » sessions. 
d) Employer solidarity in the face of union strike activity. As already 
mentioned, an employers' association can suffer from lack of cohésion, 
particularly from those companies whose resources are not adéquate to 
withstand a prolonged strike. In Ontario, the employers hâve had few 
instances of so-called défections from their ranks even though strike action 
has been fréquent18. In the 1966 négociations, the Union struck five of the 
18 Between 1959 and 1962, 127 illégal strikes were conducted. After 1962, the 
frequency decreased for a number of reasons, most important were : change in 
union leadership and the lodging of grievances by the companies against this strike 
action. 
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fifty-five employers who were signatories to the Southern General Freight 
Agreement. The Bureau immediately and successfully called for the re-
maining employers to lock-out. Over the term of the negotiations, only a 
very few firms left the Bureau, and none of thèse signed early agreements 
with the Union. 
e) Following from point d), the solidarity shown has been possible 
because many of the tactics used to split employers' association in the 
U.S. « for hire > trucking industry hâve not been available in Ontario. The 
existence of a national contract in the U.S. allows concerted activity against 
ail or selected employers at the same time. 
Ralph and Estelle James in their book « Hoffa and the Teamsters » 
explain Hoffa's strategy when dealing with large transcontinental car-
riers. 19 Such carriers will hâve local opérations in various parts of the 
country which are a minor segment of their total opération. Hoffa was 
able to use thèse employers through their less important activities to put 
pressure on other employers in the employers' associations to sign under 
Hoffa's terms. Hoffa could use a similar tactic against a local union found 
to be exhibiting too much autonomy. Friendly employers were encouraged 
to route their trucks around areas of such locals, thereby cutting off work. 
Thèse techniques are not available in Ontario. No sectors exist where 
large segments of the industry are uncontrolled and where the Union 
leader can gain control of thèse by threatening to strike a terminal with 
whom a contract exists. A final leverage technique — the open-end 
grievance procédure with the possibility of strike action is of course illégal 
in Ontario. 
In summary, the Bureau has been able to maintain a united front in 
the face of union power. This is partly the resuit of sound organizational 
policies on the part of the Bureau and partly the resuit of weaknesses in 
the Union. 
Summary and Conclusion 
It is difficult to make a statement concerning the success of multi-
employer negotiations in the Ontario « for-hire > Trucking Industry. To 
do so one would hâve to estimate what would hâve happened if this type 
of bargaining did not exist. Comparisons with U.S. expérience are of 
little aid since the labour relations climate is so différent. At first glance, 
!9 JAMES, R. and E. JAMES, Hoffa and the Teamsters, (Van Nostrand, Princeton, 
N.J., 1965), pp. 163-166. 
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one would say that in Ontario, the multi-employer style of negotiations 
has operated in favour of the employers ; whereas, in the U.S. the opposite 
is true. Wage comparisons between Ontario and the Central States Région 
show that U.S. Teamsters hâve an advantage over Ontario Teamsters even 
though parity will become a fact by 1971. 
The more interesting finding of this analysis is the sophistication of 
bargaining in an industry marked by turbulence. As stated earlier, one 
would predict a chaotic and somewhat confused bargaining situation. 
Instead, we find a mature bargaining situation. But internai dissention 
within the rank and file union members appears to hâve been the cause 
of much of the strife. Using this criterion, the style of bargaining would 
appear to hâve been successful. 
LA NÉGOCIATION MULTI-EMPLOYEUR : 
L'INDUSTRIE ONTARIENNE DU CAMIONNAGE 
Le seul exemple de l'industrie ontarienne du camionnage fournit un modèle 
sophistiqué de négociation multi-employeur et présente un climat agité de relations 
du travail, climat caractérisé par des grèves sauvages. 
La partie syndicale représentée par les unités locales des Teamsters a fait 
preuve d'une cohésion d'ensemble en négociant globalement avec l'association d'em-
ployeurs et en faisant bloc dans les arrêts de travail. L'association d'employeurs de 
son côté négocie des conventions collectives multi-employeurs et de plus simples 
contrats couvrant 65 compagnies. Cette association regroupe 21,000 membres et 
conduit les négociations par son Conseil mixte composé de représentants des onze 
locaux de la province. 
Les employeurs trouvent plusieurs avantages à ce style de négociations. Sans 
tous les mentionner, notons la possibilité d'un front commun, l'auto-détermination 
des politiques et l'absence de concurrence dans les salaires. Pour le côté syndical, 
notons entre autres avantages d'un tel style de négociations : une plus grande facilité 
d'administration et l'uniformité dans les tactiques de grèves. 
L'absence de négociation au niveau de la firme et les imperfections de l'orga-
nisation au moment de crise apparaissent comme les principaux inconvénients de 
ce type de négociation du côté patronal. Du côté syndical, la présence d'une 
menace possible de lockout constitue un désavantage marqué. 
En Ontario, la partie patronale a fait preuve d'une remarquable stabilité prin-
cipalement basée sur sa structure organisationnelle, sur la faiblesse de la partie 
syndicale, sur des techniques raffinées d'administration de conventions collectives 
et sur la solidarité des employeurs. Comme résultat, le chaos actuel résulte prin-
cipalement de la dissension à l'intérieur des syndicats. 
